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I N TRODUCT ION
Since the summer of 2015, an unprecedented inﬂux of refugees is shaking
the foundations of the European Union, causing many E.U. Member
States to revise their position and policies toward internal border control.
With the ‘‘refugee crisis’’ turning into a Schengen border crisis, in Decem-
ber 2015, the Presidency of the European Council issued a document enti-
tled the ‘‘Integrity of the Schengen area.’’1 In this document the Presidency
acknowledges that the attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, have only
complicated the various crises, further mixing a dose of terror threat into
the already fairly toxic mix. To avert a collapse of the Schengen Agreement
that lifted internal border controls between European states, the Presidency
calls for, among other things, Member States to use their powers to check
people regarding their immigration status within their own borders under
Article 23 of the Schengen Border Code (SBC), which allows checks in the
border areas between two Member States.
This policy differs from the temporary border checks that can be rein-
stated under Articles 25–28 SBC, as has been done by Germany, Austria,
Slovenia, Sweden, Norway, France, and Malta since the start of the crisis.
Whereas the latter allow Member States to temporarily reinstate 24/7
border controls at the former land borders between two Schengen states,
the former technically cannot have border control as an objective. Instead,
border checks should be carried out as nonsystematic spot checks and
should be based on general police information and experience regarding
possible threats to public security. Unlike Articles 25–28 SBC, Article 23
does not oblige the Schengen states to inform the European Commission
or other Member States of their practices. Within the framework of the
SBC, it is left to the discretion of individual states on how to shape these
checks legally and practically. As argued elsewhere (Woude & Berlo, 2015),
against the broader context of the securitization—or even more so, terror-
ization—of migration, the checks in the internal border areas of the Euro-
pean Union deserve more scrutiny (Mitsilegas, 2015). Increasing police
checks inside E.U. Member States is likely to cause new tensions within
states, as the already heightened concerns about terrorism by Islamic State
sympathizers is giving rise to increased identity controls on Muslims in
1. Council Document 14300/156, 1 December 2015. Retrieved from http://statewatch.
org/news/2015/dec/eu-council-schengen-integrity-14300-12-2015.pdf
158 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 20 | NO . 1 | W INTER 2017
some parts of the European Union. It is therefore important for the checks
to be used in a ‘‘just and fair’’ way (Guild, Brouwer, Groenendijk, &
Carrera, 2015).
In the steadily growing body of scholarship on the securitization of migra-
tion, ‘‘just and fair’’ is often assessed through the lens of ethno-racial proﬁling
and the overrepresentation of minorities in the outcome of various law
enforcement practices (Miller, 2005; Stumpf, 2006; Pratt, 2010; Pratt &
Thompson, 2008; Koulish, 2010; Hernandez, 2013). Yet, it is important to
realize that ‘‘just and fair’’ comprises more than law enforcement ofﬁcers
applying their powers in a nondiscriminatory way. It also entails that they use
their powers for the purpose for which they were formally created.
In this article we aim to examine whether the Dutch version of the
Article 23 SBC checks, known as the Mobile Security Monitor (MSM),
are exercised justly and fairly. Since The Netherlands is part of the Schen-
gen Agreement and has not temporarily reinstated permanent border
checks at the land borders with Belgium and Germany, the MSM checks
are currently the main instrument to monitor cross-border mobility.
Although MSM checks are carried out on roads, airports, boats, and trains,
the underlying ﬁeldwork for this article focused on the checks at highways
and other roads in the Dutch border areas. We will assess street-level
discretionary decision making by ofﬁcers of the Royal Netherlands
Marechaussee (RNM), the Dutch border police organization responsible
for carrying out the MSM, through the sociolegal lens of the principle of
non-misuse of competence also known as de´tournement de pouvoir.
This so-called principle of good governance entails that government
ofﬁcers act based on the authority attributed to them by the state and use
the powers ﬂowing from this authority in line with their underlying pur-
pose(s). It is unlawful to use discretionary powers to achieve a purpose
other than that for which the power was conferred (Tamir, 2006). Thus,
while stopping cars under the Road Trafﬁc Act, law enforcement ofﬁcers
can only check for compliance with this particular act: Are people speed-
ing? Are they carrying their driver’s license? Are they driving while intoxi-
cated? Trafﬁc stops cannot be used as an easy way to also search the cars for
drugs or other illegal items or activities, as that would require having
reasonable suspicion of a criminal act being committed, as established in
Article 27 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure. Derived from the
principle of legality, de´tournement de pouvoir mandates that law enforce-
ment ofﬁcers should always correctly apply the laws in order for it to be
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clear to citizens why and to what type of investigative powers they are being
subjected. This is important in ensuring due process and preventing
prejudicial or unequal treatment. By applying a sociolegal approach, this
article addresses the pressing need for more empirical and ethnographic
examinations of street-level bureaucrats involved in border policing
(Cote-Boucher, Infantino, & Salter, 2014; Loftus, 2015).
I . METHODOLOGY
This paper is based on data collected for a larger project on the legitimacy
of the MSM and decision making by Dutch RNM ofﬁcers.2 The project as
a whole uses a mixed methods research design, involving policy discourse
analysis, semistructured focus group interviews with RNM ofﬁcers, inter-
views with higher-ranked administrative staff, and observations of routines
and procedures during MSM site visits and ride-alongs. A key feature of
mixed methods research is its methodological pluralism, which offers the
advantage of incorporating the strengths of different methodological strat-
egies. For this article, we will draw from observational data as well as focus
group data.
Data for the project were collected between October 2013 and March
2015. During this period, three researchers went on 57 site visits or ride-
alongs with RNM ofﬁcers who were exercising their discretionary powers
in the context of the MSM. While present on site or in a patrol car, the
researchers—always operating in teams of two—were able to observe the
way in which the MSM was enforced and the street-level decisions that
were made by individual ofﬁcers. Observational research has a long history
and is known as a good and valuable research method to study the behavior
of law enforcement ofﬁcers in a ‘‘natural’’ setting (Reiss, 1971). It can be
used as a scientiﬁc research method to gather detailed and so-called thick
descriptions (Geertz, 1973). These can illuminate the actions of members of
a certain group and the way in which actions should be interpreted. By
2. This is the project ‘‘Crimmigration & Discretionary Decision-making in EU Border
Areas.’’ The empirical ﬁeldwork for the project was jointly conducted by Jelmer Brouwer,
Tim Dekkers, and Maartje van der Woude. The project is initiated and coordinated by
Maartje van der Woude; the dissertations resulting from the project are co-supervised with
Joanne van der Leun. All members of the research team are afﬁliated with Leiden Law
School, the Netherlands.
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being part of the setting in which actions take place, information is not
only gathered about the persons being studied, but also about the (orga-
nizational) context of those actions. Ride-alongs and site visits were carried
out at the seven RNM brigades that are responsible for carrying out the
MSM in the border areas with Belgium and Germany. All brigades were
visited at least six times, with extra visits carried out at the larger brigades.
The recurring nature of the visits, which increased the feeling of trust
between researchers and the participants, combined with the fact that it
was made very clear beforehand that the researchers were in no way afﬁl-
iated with or hired by the RNM, often resulted in a relaxed atmosphere in
which the RNM ofﬁcers were more than willing to share their views. The
often informal nature of the conversations and the familiar setting in which
they took place decreased the chance of politically correct answers (Krue-
ger, 1994; Krueger & Casey, 2000; Finch, Lewis, & Turley, 2013).
Each site visit or ride-along visit lasted between 4 to 7 hours, resulting in
a total of 800 person-hours of observational ﬁeldwork. During the site
visits, data was collected in two different ways, observations and focus
groups. By using a structured observation form, the researchers systemat-
ically collected a variety of operational data on (1) discretionary decisions
made by ofﬁcers during a check, (2) characteristics of the people and
vehicles selected for a check, and (3) the interactions between ofﬁcers and
the people that were checked. Besides collecting data systematically, during
the site visits and ride-alongs, the researchers also had plenty of time to chat
more informally with the RNM ofﬁcers. During these informal chats
taking place over lunch break or while having a cup of coffee, they would
often speak freely about their job. Since this information often contained
valuable information, it was recorded by the researchers in ﬁeld notes.
These notes also included personal reﬂections of the researchers on what
they had heard and seen, following Maanen (1979, p. 542), making these
data more presentational in nature. Valuable information from the ride-
alongs and the informal conversations were recorded in the researcher’s
ﬁeld notes. After the shifts, these ﬁeld notes were written down in a detailed
and structured manner in order to be coded.
Focus group interviews were conducted to gather more in-depth infor-
mation on speciﬁc subjects related to discretion and street-level decision
making in the context of the MSM. Focus group interviews are useful for
exploring and examining what people think, how they think, and why they
think the way they do about the issues of importance to them, without
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pressuring them into making decisions or reaching a consensus. Focus
groups permit researchers to search for the reasons why particular views
are held by individuals and groups. The method also provides insight into
the similarities and differences of understandings held by people (Krueger,
1994; Krueger & Casey, 2000; Finch, Lewis, & Turley, 2013). A total of
thirteen focus groups with six to ten participants each were divided over all
seven brigades, resulting in 25 hours of conversation. All focus groups
consisted of a mixture of more and less experienced ofﬁcers involved in
the MSM on an operational level. During most focus groups, all RNM
ofﬁcers present participated in the discussion—some more actively than
others, which is one of the most important limitations of focus group
interviews (Krueger & Casey, 2009). Yet, knowing this pitfall, the mod-
erator directly intervened in such instances. Being a military organization,
younger and less experienced or lower-ranked ofﬁcers often kept a some-
what low proﬁle. Again, when noticed by the moderator, these ofﬁcers
would be explicitly asked to respond. The focus group interviews were
audiotaped, transcribed verbatim, and coded; the quotations included in
this article originated in this project, some from focus group interviews and
some from ride-alongs. All data were analyzed with software for qualitative
analysis, Atlas-Ti.
I I . DE´TOURNEMENT DE POUVO IR AND NOBLE CAUSE
DEC IS ION MAK ING
While executing the MSM, ofﬁcers enjoy a great amount of discretion
since they do not need to have reasonable suspicion to check a vehicle.
This ﬂexibility makes them powerful street-level bureaucrats in charge of
the ﬁnal implementation of public policy (Lipsky, 2010). Many scholars
have identiﬁed discretion—and more so the abuse of it (Weber, 2003;
Motomura, 2011; Wadhia, 2015; Hernandez, 2013; Eagly, 2011; Reyes,
2012; Woude & Leun, in press)—as an important driver behind the process
of crimmigration: the merger of crime control and immigration control
(Stumpf, 2006, 2011, 2013; Aliverti, 2014; Chaco´n, 2014; Sitkin, 2014;
Spena, 2014).
Discretion is a necessary tool for the welfare and regulatory functions of
modern government (Davis, 1971). As Weber notes (2003), ‘‘While high
levels of discretion are often associated with failure to meet the most basic
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requirements of justice (that is, that decisions should be fair and not
arbitrary) it is recognized that a certain amount of discretion can bring
positive beneﬁts’’ (p. 250). In other words, by enabling decision makers to
mitigate the unintended outcomes of the application of rules in individual
cases, discretion can contribute to justice (Schneider, 1992). Obviously, it is
precisely this same ﬂexibility with regard to applying the rules that makes
discretion susceptible to misuse and abuse, and thereby potentially con-
tributing to injustice, for instance, by favoring certain social groups over
others. Discretion is a sphere of autonomy within which decisions are to
some degree a matter of personal judgment and assessment (Galligan,
1986). In that sphere the public ofﬁcer who has the authority is free to
make the choice between possible courses of action or inaction, between
using a certain power illegally or not. The principle of de´tournement de
pouvoir can be seen as the legal embodiment of the notion that discretion
can be easily misused or even abused. By explicitly underlining the fact that
state ofﬁcers are also bound by the restrictions of the law, and thus the
restrictions of their powers, the principle lies at the heart of the rule of law.
As Hawkins (1992, 2003) has noted, street-level discretionary decision
making is inﬂuenced by many factors on the organizational, political,
legislative, social, and individual level. This is deﬁnitely also the case for
the decisions made by RNM ofﬁcers during the MSM (Dekkers, Woude,
& Leun, 2016; Woude & Leun, in press). In this article we are not so much
looking to identify these factors but to understand the intentions and
rationalizations behind certain street-level decisions.
For many years, policing scholars have analyzed the problematic nature
of discretion for street-level bureaucrats by focusing on the central ethical
dilemma the police face in a democracy. On one hand, they are bound to
procedural law of due process. On the other hand, they are occupationally
and morally committed to the ‘‘good end’’ in the sense that they are
responsible for arresting and removing dangerous individuals from soci-
ety (Klockars, 1983; see also Alderson, 1998). Both factors do not always go
hand-in-hand. Brown (1981) describes how police ofﬁcers tended to see
their work as a game of cops and robbers, in which the police sometimes
had to break the rules in order to catch the robbers. In line with Brown’s
ﬁndings, Skolnick (1982) shows how police ofﬁcers seemed to be more
concerned with the production of arrests and confessions than with truth-
ﬁnding, making them resort to quite undemocratic behavior (Skolnick,
1982, 1994). In an attempt to better characterize why police ofﬁcers
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committed to achieving good outcomes would at some point in their
careers willingly and knowingly break the law to do so, Crank, Flaherty,
and Giacomazzi (2007) introduced the concept of ‘‘noble cause.’’ Meese
and Ortmeier (2003) deﬁned the ‘‘noble cause’’ as a commitment to do
something to prevent illegal human behavior and apprehend criminal
offenders. It inspires ofﬁcer values and morally justiﬁes their actions.
Caldero and Crank (2004, p. 29) similarly deﬁned the ‘‘noble cause’’ as
‘‘a moral commitment to make the world a safer place to live. Put simply,
it is getting bad guys off the street.’’ These two deﬁnitions share the
common theme that the noble cause is a moral conviction associated
with the public safety function of police work that emphasizes ends-
oriented action.
As Crank and colleagues (2007) note, the noble cause is almost always
presented in negative terms. The good end, negatively described, may be
used to justify controversial and even illegal behavior when it serves a larger
purpose (see for example, Barker, Friery, & Carter, 1994). Most scholarship
on the noble cause has focused on the negative aspect, commonly called
‘‘noble cause corruption,’’ and described in terms of the evasion or violation
of procedural constraints in order to control crime and disorder (see Cal-
dero & Crank, 2004). Less dramatic but equally important, one can view
the noble cause as a commitment to achieve the good end and still act
legally, using policy and law as resources to achieve a broader good (Crank
et al., 2007). From this perspective, the noble cause is a positive attribute
associated with police professionalism, and provides a moral center for
ethical decision making (Meese & Ortmeier, 2003). It remains to be seen
which of the two interpretations of noble cause policing is most applicable
to the case of the MSM.
I I I . SELECT ING AND SEARCH ING VEH ICLES
The MSM checks are the Dutch legal translation of Article 23 SBC. In the
period January 2011 to August 2015, the RNM has carried out a total of
30,190 MSM checks on the roads and highways in the border areas with
Germany and Belgium. As this policy is also being carried out on trains and
in airports and ports, this number does not reﬂect the total number of
MSM checks. As the table shows, the number of checks per year is not
stable.
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The ﬂuctuations per year are most likely the result of changes in the
available capacity for the MSM. Performing both civic and military duties
and falling under three different ministries—the Ministry of Defense, the
Ministry of Security & Justice, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs—the
RNM is a rather complicated organization with a wide range of different
tasks. Besides the MSM, they also control the country’s external border at
airports and other ports of entry, join military missions abroad, and are
responsible for security at various locations in the Netherlands, including
airports, royal palaces, and other high-risk security sites. In total 5,846
RNM ofﬁcers can be sent to different places to perform different tasks,
based on where they are needed the most. Since the available data do not
cover the period in which the ‘‘refugee crisis’’ started and developed, nor
the attacks in Paris and Brussels, it will be interesting to see the numbers for
the last quarter of 2015 and the ﬁrst couple of months of 2016, since the use
of the MSM checks has been intensiﬁed ever since (Woude, 2015).
A. The ‘‘Crimmigrant’’ Nature of the MSM
The MSM was originally created in response to the lifting of the internal
borders following the Schengen Agreement. Its legal foundation is laid down
in Article 50 of the Dutch Aliens Act (AA; 2000) and Article 4.17a of the
Aliens Decree (AD). It is not the only form of immigration control in the
Netherlands, as another organization, the Aliens Police, is responsible for
immigration controls inside the Dutch territory. Looking at the legal foun-
dation of the MSM and its formal aim—combating illegal entry and stay in
the Netherlands after crossing the border—shows that it is meant as an
Table 1. Number of MSN checks on roads and
highways per year in absolute numbers
Year Number
2011 6.757
2012 7.813
2013 7.217
2014 5.646
2015* 2.757
Total 30.190
* Until August 2015. Source: Royal Netherlands Marechaussee
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instrument of administrative immigration control. The MSM checks are
carried out on the highways and other roads in the Dutch borderlands with
Germany and Belgium. Since the SBC forbids actual border checks, the
MSMcan be carried out in a 20-km area around the land borders, in the form
of nonsystematic spot checks. Cars can be selected for theMSMonlywhen it
is clear that they actually crossed the border to enter into the Netherlands.
In line with the central aim of the MSM, the main task of RNM ofﬁcers
is to check the identity and resident status of people by checking their legal
documentation (e.g., passport, European ID card, and visa). Despite the
right to free movement throughout the European Union, people are still
required to carry valid documentation while travelling through Europe.
Over the years, both the goal of the MSM and its legal framework
expanded slightly to include ﬁghting human smuggling and identity fraud
as forms of cross-border crime that could be directly linked to the original
goal of combating illegal stay (Woude & Leun, in press). Whereas the
MSM used to be an instrument solely focused on immigration control,
this inclusion has slightly opened the door to crime control as well. The
extension of powers was driven by an efﬁciency rationale. Under the new
rules, when encountering a case of human smuggling or identity fraud
during an MSM check, RNM ofﬁcers no longer had to consign the case
to the National Police, but had the authority to deal with these cases
themselves. Around the same time its name changed from Mobile Aliens
Monitor to Mobile Security Monitor, suggesting a broader aim than illegal
immigration only. Yet, the law is very clear on the fact that the ‘‘crime
control’’ authority of the RNM while performing the MSM is strictly
limited to these two forms of crime. Attributing these dual powers—immi-
gration control and crime control—to RNM ofﬁcers can be seen as trou-
blesome from a crimmigration perspective. Not only does it seem to imply
a link between certain forms of crime and immigration, it also ﬁts in within
the more general tendency toward ‘‘ad hoc instrumentalism’’ (Sklansky,
2012) that is visible within both criminal and administrative law, as RNM
ofﬁcers are able to choose which powers they employ depending on the
situation at hand. According to Sklansky (2012), ‘‘ad hoc instrumentalism’’
is one of the important driving factors behind crimmigration. He deﬁnes
ad hoc instrumentalism as
a manner of thinking about law and legal institutions that downplays concerns
about consistency and places little stock in formal legal categories, but instead
sees legal rules and legal procedures simply as a set of interchangeable tools. In
166 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 20 | NO . 1 | W INTER 2017
any given situation, faced with any given problem, [ofﬁcers] are encouraged to
use whichever tools are most effective against the person or persons causing
the problem. (p. 161)
As we will elaborate upon in the following sections, despite the fact that
the Dutch legislature aimed to clearly distinguish between circumstances
under which RNM ofﬁcers act as crime control ofﬁcers or immigration
control ofﬁcers, our observations showed that this distinction wasn’t always
reﬂected by the actions of ofﬁcers enforcing the MSM on the street.
B. Lawfully Frisking and Searching
Once a vehicle has been stopped for an MSM check, following Article 50
of the Dutch Aliens Act in conjunction with Article 4.21 of the Aliens
Decree, RNM ofﬁcers are entitled to ascertain the identity, nationality,
and immigration status of the driver and his or her passengers. This will
typically be done by asking the occupants for their passports or other valid
ID and/or status documentation. A driver’s license is not considered
a valid ID under the Aliens Decree (Art. 4.21 AD). If one of the occupants
cannot hand over any of the required documentation, and only if it has
been impossible to ascertain their identity otherwise (Sect. A2/3, Aliens
Circular 2013)—by using less intrusive means—an ofﬁcer can search the
person concerned by checking their clothing, their bags, or their body for
any information that might shed light on their identity and/or immigra-
tion status (Art. 50, Sects. 1 & 5, Aliens Act; in relation with Sect. A2/3,
Aliens Circular 2013). Since July 1998, RNM ofﬁcers are also allowed to
search vehicles, a competence laid down in Article 51 of the Dutch Aliens
Act. According to this article, they are allowed to search a vehicle if, based
on objectively measurable facts and circumstances, they have a reasonable
suspicion that the vehicle transports persons falling under the scope of the
MSM. Section A2/2 of the Aliens Circular (AC) identiﬁes three objec-
tively measurable sources upon which the required reasonable suspicion
can be based:
 Facts or circumstances of the situation under which the person is
stopped;
 Indications on the person that is stopped (with indications referring
to known police information on the vehicle or the person);
 Experience of the RNM ofﬁcer performing the MSM.
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The above criteria are rather vague and elastic. In practice it comes down
to individual ofﬁcers’ discretion on how and when to exercise their stop-
and-search powers. So even despite the required ‘‘reasonable suspicion,’’
RNM ofﬁcer enjoy a great amount of discretion in their decision making
on whether or not to search a car. Nevertheless, the law is very clear on the
fact that both the discretionary power to frisk a person or to search a vehicle
only could be exercised when the occupant(s) of a vehicle is/are unable to
hand over their documentation.
C. Switching Hats and the Complicated Continued Application
of Powers
According to the principle of de´tournement de pouvoir, RNM ofﬁcer are
allowed to use the powers attributed to them under the MSM only to
combat illegal stay, identify fraud, or combat human smuggling. They are
not allowed to stop a vehicle based on suspicions of any other form of
cross-border crime, such as human trafﬁcking or drug smuggling. Doing
so would constitute a misuse of competence by employing the discretion-
ary power to stop and search a vehicle under the MSM to achieve a pur-
pose other than that for which that power was originally conferred. It is
important to distinguish between this illegal practice and the situation in
which an RNM ofﬁcer, unprompted, stumbles upon a criminal act—
other than identity fraud or human smuggling—while performing the
MSM check. The latter could, for instance, be the case, if an RNM ofﬁcer
sees a weapon or drugs in the car while asking the driver for their ID.
Whereas the reasons to originally select and check the car fall under the
scope of the MSM, while performing his legal powers under the MSM,
the RNM ofﬁcer is put in the situation where he spontaneously comes
across a criminal act not falling under the scope of the MSM. Since it
would be highly undesirable to ask RNM ofﬁcers to ignore this, the
Dutch Supreme Court has ruled that in these circumstances law enforce-
ment ofﬁcer, including the RNM, have the authority to ‘‘switch hats’’ from
administrative control to crime control (Luchtman, 2007). The latter means
that the RNM ofﬁcer has to notify the driver of the changed nature of the
check, and that he or she is now suspected of having committed a certain
crime and has the right to remain silent. In Dutch, this practice is referred
to as the leer van de voortgezette toepassing, or the ‘‘continued application of
powers’’ doctrine.
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Although it may sound rather straightforward to distinguish between
these two situations, in practice it is quite difﬁcult to prove whether a law
enforcement ofﬁcer acted with improper purpose, breaching the principle
of de´tournement de pouvoir (Borgers, 2011). Under Article 359a of the Dutch
Code of Criminal Procedure, obtaining evidence by acting with improper
purpose can lead to the exclusion of that evidence in court. In a vast line of
case law the Dutch Supreme Court has ruled that, to prove improper
purpose, one has to show that a certain power was indeed applied with
improper purpose.3 In a recent ruling by the Court of Appeal in Amster-
dam,4 the National Police was found to structurally abuse their power to
stop cars under the Trafﬁc Act for crime control instead of trafﬁc control
purposes. According to the Court the National Police was found guilty of
‘‘criminal ﬁshing expeditions: investigative activities based on vague risk
characteristics without any form of reasonable suspicion of a criminal act,
as a result of which they had obtained information that would not normally
be accessible.’’ All results and gains of this illegal and unjust ﬁshing expe-
dition were excluded from the evidence.
Although it might be possible to prove that a certain power was applied
with mixed motives, establishing that it was consciously and solely applied
improperly would be difﬁcult. In the above mentioned case, several police
ofﬁcers had testiﬁed about the true goal of trafﬁc stops, leaving no doubt
about their mixed motives. This type of evidence is rare. As a result, Dutch
legal scholars disagree about the extent to which mixed motives should
actually result in the verdict of de´tournement de pouvoir. According to Aler
(1982, p. 27), as long as the dominant motive is the speciﬁed purpose of the
power, it will not matter that an ancillary purpose is also achieved. How-
ever, Keijzer (2002) offers a slightly different perspective. He argues that to
claim that someone acted with improper purpose, the court must assess the
extent to which the legislature has attributed a certain power exclusively for
a certain purpose and whether applying this power for other purposes was
explicitly forbidden. If this exclusivity is lacking, one can only speak of
improper purpose if it can be established that a power was applied solely for
purposes other than the legislature intended (Knigge, 1988).5
3.Dutch Supreme Court, 21November 2006, ECLI: NL: HR: 2006: AY9670, NJ 2006,
653 (‘‘Gypsy women-verdict’’).
4. Court of Appeals in Amsterdam, 21 December 2015, ECLI: NL: GHAMS: 2015: 5307.
5. Section 26-18 of the conclusion, HR 6 November 2001, NJ 2002, 189.
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I V . IN SEARCH OF SOMETH ING I L LEGAL
Having observed 330 MSM checks and having spoken to many RNM
ofﬁcers about the various decisions they made during a check, in this
section we will share our ﬁndings on what underlying rationalizations
seemed to inﬂuence an RNM ofﬁcer’s decision to search a vehicle. Before
zooming in on the decision to search a vehicle or not, it is important to
mention that we found great differences among participants regarding their
perception of what their core task was—or should be—while performing
the MSM. The street-level perceptions on the aim of the MSM and one’s
task while enforcing it are rather diffuse, as ofﬁcers disagreed on the exact
aim and scope of the controls and therewith also on the use of their powers.
Whereas the majority of those we spoke with during the site visits and the
focus groups seemed aware of the legal framework of the MSM and the fact
that the MSM is predominantly meant to be an instrument of immigration
control, a fair number of ofﬁcers thought the scope of the MSM was
broader. They believed that the MSM was predominantly an instrument
of crime control, focusing on all forms of cross-border crime. When asked
for an explanation, this group would always refer to fact that the ‘‘S’’ in
MSM stood for ‘‘Security’’ and that they were thus expected to enforce
security (Woude, Dekkers, & Brouwer, 2015; Woude & Leun, in press). In
line with the different perspectives on the core business of the MSM,
during the ﬁeldwork respondents would refer to some colleagues being
more ‘‘immigrant-prone’’ and others more ‘‘crime-prone,’’ meaning that
some ofﬁcers focused more on detecting potential illegal immigrants,
whereas others tended to be primarily interested in catching criminals. The
majority of the RNM ofﬁcer who were aware of the fact that the MSM’s
crime control potential was limited to human smuggling and identity fraud
still held the opinion that their crime control powers under the MSM
should be widened.
A. A ‘‘Creative’’ Use of the Limited Discretionary Power to Search
a Vehicle
During the ﬁeldwork we regularly asked why a certain vehicle was stopped
and/or searched, especially in those cases when there appeared to be no
reason to do so under the legal framework of the MSM, because the driver
and other vehicle occupants were in possession of a valid ID and or
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passport. In response, respondents would regularly refer to the necessity of
‘‘being creative’’ with their powers while enforcing the MSM. ‘‘Being
creative,’’ they made clear, did not mean abusing or overstating their
power; instead, it referred to being savvy about ‘‘knowing what powers
to use and when.’’ This strategy was illustrated when a car with a Dutch
license plate and three Dutch men was stopped. The father and his two
sons lived nearby and were known to some of the ofﬁcers for their past
involvement in various criminal activities. The driver possessed only a dri-
ver’s license, which is not ofﬁcially a valid ID. Even though the ofﬁcers
knew the men and that they were all Dutch citizens, they nonetheless
decided to conduct a thorough search of the vehicle. Although technically
this strategy was lawful, it was clear that the original aim of the power to
search—namely, to ﬁnd documents to prove someone’s identity or resi-
dence status—played no role here.
Knowing that they were legally allowed to search a vehicle only as a last
resort to identify its occupant(s) or when there is reason to suspect that
a crime was committed, RNM ofﬁcer described various creative ways to
circumvent these legal restrictions posed by the Aliens Act. One of the ways
that was often mentioned was the use of the possibility to search a car under
Article 9 of the Dutch Opium Act. Under Article 9, smelling marijuana or
seeing a small amount of marijuana constitutes the necessary reasonable
suspicion to ‘‘look through’’ a vehicle. It is not possible to completely strip
search a car and all someone’s belongings based on this article.
When I see a blunt lying in the car, a crime was committed and that’s when
the Code of Criminal Procedure allows you to search through a car.
When you smell something [like marihuana], you just tear apart the whole
vehicle.
As both quotes illustrate, the ofﬁcers concerned are aware of the existence
of legal powers to access a car through the presence of marijuana, but are
lacking knowledge about important details such as (1) the formal legal
ground and (2) the limited scope of an Article 9 search.
Another alternative legal basis to search a vehicle for which there is no
ground to do so under the legal framework of the MSM, would be under
the Arms and Ammunitions Act, if a person is carrying an illegal weapon.
In ﬁnding such an ‘‘illegal weapon,’’ RNM ofﬁcers indeed proved to be
rather creative. It was standard practice at some of the brigades to open the
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driver’s car door the moment a car was pulled over, even before a driver
would have had the chance to hand over their ID or passport. Although this
practice can technically be seen as the start of a car search, the respondents
did not seem to view it as such. For them it was a way to look inside the
front of the car and check for the presence of illegal substances or illegal
weapons. They often justiﬁed this practice by referring to the need to think
about their own safety. In deﬁning what could be considered an illegal
weapon, RNM ofﬁcers also were quite resourceful. Aside from the few
actual illegal weapons (tasers and large knives) that were found over the
course of the ﬁeldwork, ofﬁcers considered other objects as potentially
dangerous as well: various tools, small knives, baseball bats. Although the
presence of these objects would not ordinarily result in an ofﬁcial search of
the vehicle, while referring to the fact that it was ‘‘unnecessary’’ and ‘‘some-
what suspicious,’’ RNM ofﬁcers asked the driver to put these objects in the
trunk. That way, they would be able to take a look in the trunk without
needing an ofﬁcial ‘‘legal’’ reason. Another option some ofﬁcers mentioned
was to simply ask people if they wanted to open the trunk for them,
reasoning that this meant that the driver gave permission if he or she indeed
opened the trunk. There was, however, disagreement among ofﬁcers about
this tactic, as others argued that this would too easily be considered as an
order instead of a question, and people would not really feel like they have
the option to say no.
These examples illustrate that participants were very clever when it came
to ﬁnding their ways around the limitations of the Aliens Act in order to
search a car without outright abusing their powers by not even trying to
ﬁnd a legal ground to legitimate their actions. Other than by spontaneously
stumbling upon something that allows them to switch hats from immigra-
tion control to crime control, they are actively searching for something
allowing them to do so. It is exactly this active searching and rather exten-
sive interpretation of ‘‘spontaneously stumbling upon’’ a potential criminal
offense that constitutes the creative nature of RNM ofﬁcers’ actions. Some
respondents during the focus groups stated that, according to them, a stop
should always end at the moment a persons’ identiﬁcation was established,
and one should never be actively looking anymore for other ways to get
access to a car. However, this was clearly a minority standpoint.
I don’t understand why they’re giving us such a hard time with these trunks,
why don’t they just change it [the Aliens Act]. Just let us check these trunks,
in the end it’s all about safety and security.
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I just think we should be able to search everything. They are crossing the
border, they are travelling to the Netherlands. I am of the opinion that we
should be able to search through everything: dashboard, trunk, luggage and
if necessary also frisk the people inside the car.
RNM ofﬁcers clearly believed that crime control is an important part of
the MSM and that the formal powers granted to them are insufﬁcient. The
possibility of ﬁnding drugs or weapons were perceived as especially impor-
tant reasons to search a vehicle. Although human smuggling actually does
fall under the scope of the MSM, ofﬁcers did not refer to it as a reason to
open the trunk more often. Although some ofﬁcers did mention the pos-
sibility to open a trunk based on the suspicion of human smuggling, they
were quick to add that, in order to justify this, one would actually need
more indicators than just a gut feeling, and this was rarely the case.
Whereas respondents were reluctant to admit that being creative with
their discretion to search a car could be a misuse of power, they also knew
they needed to be careful about how to justify their ‘‘creativity’’ when
writing a report. Yet, while ﬂagging this as important, ofﬁcers were also
quick to add that it was not very difﬁcult: referring to having acted based on
‘‘professional knowledge and experience’’ would ‘‘do the trick.’’ They also
knew that the RNM as an organization did not crack down on potential
misuse of powers since ‘‘no one will be ﬁred for such a thing.’’
B. Intentionally Overstepping Legal Boundaries
Whereas respondents regarded their strategies as ‘‘creative’’ use of their
discretionary powers, and therefore justiﬁed, they also offered some exam-
ples in which they willingly and knowingly overstepped their discretionary
powers. In those cases, even though they risked having the illegally ob-
tained evidence excluded from proceedings, respondents stated that to
them it was more important to make sure that certain illegal goods would
not make it to the consumer market. As various ofﬁcers explained, in these
cases the end justiﬁed the means.
Showing your driver’s license is not sufﬁcient. It doesn’t show the residence
status. In that case, we’ll search the trunk. We also searched through the
garbage bags in the trunk and found 10 stolen GPS systems, together worth
15.000 euros. But we did know his identity based on his license, so according
to the Aliens Circular the search was illegal. The prosecutor released the
guys, but the GPS systems remain conﬁscated by the state.
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So we pull over his car because his brake light wasn’t working and without
any reason we go through his trunk. 10 KG of weed and we have a case. The
case completely collapsed, but the weed was off the streets.
Despite some discussion of whether the situations referred to in the
abovementioned quotes were dealt with correctly by their colleagues, in
general all respondents felt highly responsible for the national security of
the Netherlands. Given that strong desire to protect the nation state from
‘‘all danger,’’ ofﬁcers felt frustrated about the fact that they were so limited
by the law. The following quote aptly captures this strongly felt frustration:
We’re based in these border areas and the name is mobile SECURITY
monitor. We’re the ﬁrst ones to guarantee the security of the Netherlands,
that’s the focus of our organization. And if that’s your target, to monitor the
security in the Netherlands while also saying that I cannot fully use my
crime control powers because that’s not what I am here for . . .Well hello,
I need to know who is entering my country? I need to create a secure sit-
uation. That is my task, isn’t it?’’
Indeed, many ofﬁcers not only felt a strong need to protect the Dutch state
against all sorts of risky invaders, but also believed that the formal powers
granted to them were not always enough to fulﬁll this task. This perception
leads some RNM ofﬁcers to be creative with their powers or even to
overstep their legal boundaries.
Whereas the observations and focus group interviews show a clear
emphasis on crime control among the larger part of the participants, even
among those who know that the crime control part of the MSM is limited
to ID fraud and human smuggling, this emphasis is also reﬂected by
statistical data on the outcomes of MSM operations. As shown in Table 2,
the number of non-MSM-related crime control entries as a result of MSM
road and highway checks—being entered in the system for anything other
than human smuggling and ID fraud—is signiﬁcantly higher than the
number of entries for MSM-related crime control incidents. In the same
period only 2002 irregular migrants were found.
Since the system from which the data were retrieved also functions as
a database of information that might be helpful for future MSM checks,
being included in the database does not necessarily equal an actual crime or
any form of punishable criminal behavior. It could also entail more sub-
jective information on a car or person that an individual RNM ofﬁcer
thought was acting suspicious without being able to label it as such. The
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strong emphasis on including information or actual incidents falling out-
side the ofﬁcial scope of the MSM is a convincing indicator of the strong
focus on crime and not so much on migration.
CONCLUS ION : THE NOBLE SECUR I TY MON ITOR?
Knowing that they are allowed to switch hats from immigration control to
crime control while spontaneously stumbling upon a criminal act during
MSM checks, RNM ofﬁcers have also proven to be creative in increasing the
possibilities to do so.When asked about this, they seem to make a distinction
between what they believe to be ﬂat-out abuse of power and ‘‘just knowing
how to be creative with the law.’’ Assessing these practices in light of the
principle of de´tournement de pouvoir, the central question is whether the
powers attributed to the RNM under the MSM are used for other purposes
than those intended by the legislature. Based on the ﬁeldwork, the answer is
positive. With some exceptions, the MSM is largely used as an easy way to
pull over vehicles after crossing the Dutch border to ensure that they are not
up to anything illegal, rather than making sure that occupants are not enter-
ing the country illegally (i.e., irregularly). By explicitly stating that it is
important to be aware of how to justify their actions in reports, ofﬁcers seem
to realize this is questionable practice. One could argue that the underlying
reasons for this misuse of the MSM are rather noble. There is a ﬁrm belief
among RNM street-level ofﬁcers that they are the frontline of national
defense and that it is their core duty to keep the country safe. Being creative
is seen as a small price to pay for achieving this greater good. In the case of the
MSM, and perhaps in slight defense of the street-level RNM ofﬁcers, it
should be noted that the existing legal framework of the MSM is indeed
complex. Also, the strong emphasis on security is most likely fuelled by the
organizational decision to change the name of the monitor from Mobile
Table 2. Crime control entries in the period January 2011 to August 2015 (MSM
on the roads)
Crime control entries Number Percentage
Falling under scope of MSM 2.622 6.2
Not falling under scope MSM 39.544 93.8
Total 42.166 100.0
Source: Royal Netherlands Marechaussee.
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Aliens Monitor to Mobile Security Monitor. Nevertheless, this does not take
away the unjust nature in the way the MSM seems to be enforced.
Besides being unjust and illegal, the application of the MSM as a means
of crime control fuelled by the seemingly noble motivation of keeping the
country safe is also problematic from the perspective of crimmigration. To
identify dangerous individuals—immigrants and criminals both ﬁtting this
category—on the legislative level a hybrid web of social control is spun in
such a way that street-level law enforcement ofﬁcers have the liberty—or
take the liberty—to choose between their criminal and administrative—
immigration law—powers. Whichever route they take, crime control or
migration control, does not really matter, as long as their actions are
effective (Miller, 2005; Stumpf, 2006; Chaco´n, 2012; Woude, Leun, &
Nijland, 2014). With the misuse of powers under the MSM resulting only
in the exclusion of evidence and not in any disciplinary sanctions, RNM
ofﬁcers are not encouraged to respect the boundaries of the law. Something
that we have not touched upon in this article is the question of how the crime
control focus of RNM ofﬁcers performing their MSM duties relates to their
general perceptions of immigrants. In the light of our ﬁndings and the
dominant securitization of migration discourse throughout the European
Union, various ethnic and national groups are predominantly targeted based
on their ‘‘foreign’’ appearance or alleged involvement in various forms of
crime. Whereas North African–looking people were regularly stopped
because of potential illegal stay, especially when their car had a foreign license
plate, ofﬁcers also indicated a few times that a stop involving young
Moroccan-looking men was primarily based on crime-related reasons. It was
commonly believed that young men with Moroccan or, more generally,
North African backgrounds are disproportionally involved in crime, partic-
ularly drug-related offenses. However, most frequently and openly associated
with criminal behavior were people from Central and Eastern European
countries, primarily Bulgarians and Romanians, and to a lesser extent Hun-
garians and Polish. This was reﬂected in the relatively large number of
vehicles stopped that had Eastern European license plates. Ofﬁcers regularly
indicated that a Bulgarian or Romanian license plate was sufﬁcient reason for
them to make a check, driven by a variety of risks that range from mobility-
related offenses like human trafﬁcking and false identiﬁcation papers, to
more mundane crimes such as pickpocketing and theft (Brouwer, 2016).
Whereas the Presidency of the European Council encourages Schengen
Member States in the wake of the current refugee crises to increase their use
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of Article 23 SBC, the Dutch case has shown that these ‘‘Schengen proof’’
police or immigration checks are not without problems. Their highly
discretionary nature makes the checks susceptible to misuse and even
abuse, whereas the population primarily targeted by these checks—non-
nationals—is less likely to notice this because of their limited knowledge of
the national legislation containing the exact rules for Article 23 SBC checks.
Further, other than a Member State’s decision to temporarily reinstate
internal border checks, Article 23 SBC checks can largely remain invisible
to the European Commission since they are seen as national matter as long
as the national framework governing them is in line with the SBC. Despite
some scholars questioning the legitimacy of Article 23 SBC checks, they
mistakenly remain largely under-scrutinized on a European level.
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